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Abstract: The Bonacich centrality is a well-known measure of the importance of nodes in a
network, concept that is, for example, at the core of the famous Google’s page-rank algorithm.
In this paper we analyze the network formation when each node aims at maximizing its own
centrality by deciding how to rewire its out-links. More precisely, we frame the problem in a
game-theoretic setting: we consider a game in which each node of the network can decide where to
place its m out-links, having its own centrality as utility function. We study the Nash equilibria
(NE) and the best response dynamics of this game and we provide a complete classification of
the NE when m “ 1, 2. Our analysis shows that the centrality maximization performed by each
node tends to create disconnected or loosely connected networks, namely 2-cliques for m “ 1
and rings or a special Butterfly graph when m “ 2. These results follow by showing that for
m “ 1, 2 the best response action of a node is always local.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a seminal paper the American sociologist Bonacich
(1987) introduced a family of centrality measures for net-
works that have found wide applications in many contexts,
as in social networks (e.g. representing citations among
scientists), in describing Nash equilibria in networked
quadratic games (C. Ballester (2006)), in production net-
works among firms (Acemoglu et al. (2012)), or in opinion
dynamics models as the Friedkin-Johnsen model (Friedkin
and Johnsen (1990)).
Formally, the Bonacich centrality of a (directed) network
is the unique vector pi (upon normalization) such that
pii “ β
ÿ
jPNi
pij
dj
` p1´ βqηi (1)
where, for each node i, Ni is the out-neighborhood of i,
di “ |Ni| is its out-degree, ηi can be interpreted as a sort
of a-priori centrality (possibly the same for all nodes), and
β P p0, 1q is some fixed parameter. A famous instance of
the Bonacich centrality is the so-called page-rank centrality
for web pages, introduced by Brin and Page (1998), which
is at the core of modern search engines like Google. Any
search query on the web leads indeed to a set of possible
related web pages that are sorted and presented according
to their centrality ranking by the engine.
‹ Giacomo Como is also with the Department of Automatic
Control, Lund University, Sweden. This work was partially sup-
ported by MIUR grant Dipartimenti di Eccellenza 2018–2022 [CUP:
E11G18000350001], the Swedish Research Council, and by the Com-
pagnia di San Paolo.
Due to the relevance of the page-rank centrality for the
external visibility of a web page, the problem of under-
standing how this measure can be modified by perturbing
the network has recently become very popular. Equation
(1) suggests that the centrality of a node is somewhat
inherited by the nodes connected to it: a node is important
in the measure that important nodes have a link to it.
However, the effect on the centrality caused by adding
or deleting links in the network is not obvious from the
recursive definition (1). It is not difficult to see that the
addition of a link pi, jq always increases the centrality of
the node j; less clear is how it affects the centrality of node
i or, possibly, of all the other nodes in the network. In a
context like that of web pages, where each node can decide
only where to point its out-links, the question of how such
choice modifies its centrality and what is the rewiring that
can possibly optimize it, turns out to be a natural relevant
question. A first analysis in this sense can be found in
Avrachenkov and Litvak (2006) and in de Kerchove et al.
(2008).
In this paper, we take this point of view by assuming that
nodes are left free to choose their out-links and we cast
the problem into a game-theoretic setting where rewards
of nodes are exactly their centralities. We study Nash
equilibria and the behavior of best response dynamics for
this game. In this way, the problem becomes an instance of
network formation. More precisely, we study the problem
under the assumption that all nodes are allowed to place
the same number m of out-links and we obtain a complete
classification of the Nash equilibria in the cases when
m “ 1 and m “ 2. The main message that comes from
this analysis is that the centrality maximization performed
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by each node tends to create disconnected or loosely
connected networks: the components are 2-cliques in the
case m “ 1, rings and a special Butterfly graph for m “ 2.
While completing this research, we discovered that the
same game-theoretic setting was considered in Cominetti
et al. (2019), where authors prove the existence of an
ordinal potential in general cases. Our classification results
are however independent as, we believe, they cannot be
derived by their results.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to
a formal presentation of the game theoretical setting and
Section 3 describes the main results. All technical results
and proofs are in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5
containing a summary and some open problems.
2. THE MODEL
In this section, we formally define the centrality maximiza-
tion game and we state the problems we want to address.
We first discuss the concept of Bonacich centrality for a
generic graph.
We consider a directed graph G “ pV, Eq where V “
t1, . . . , nu is the set of nodes and E Ď V ˆ V is the set of
(directed) edges. We assume throughout the paper that G
does not contain self-loops. As it is customary, in- and out-
neighborhoods of a node i are indicated, respectively, by
N´i and Ni. Their cardinalities d
´
i “ |N´i | and di “ |Ni|
are, respectively, the in- and the out-degree of node i.
Under the assumption that di ą 0 for every i P V, we
equip G with the normalized weight matrix R defined as
Rij “ 1
di
1tpi,jqPEu,
where 1 is the characteristic function. The Bonacich cen-
trality (1) of G can be more compactly written as
pi “ p1´ βqpI ´ βR1q´1η (2)
where I is the identity matrix, β P p0, 1q, η P Rn is a fixed
probability vector 1 and R1 denotes the transpose of the
matrix R. A direct check shows that pi is a probability
vector. Expanding (2) in a power series, we can write the
centrality of a node i explicitly as
pii “ p1´ βq
«
ηi ` β
ÿ
j
ηjRji ` β2
ÿ
j,l
ηjRjlRli ` ¨ ¨ ¨
ff
.
(3)
Interpreting η as a vector assigning an a-priori centrality
(not depending on the graph) to each node (possibly
the uniform one ηi “ n´1 for all i), formula p3q says
that the Bonacich centrality of a node in the graph G
is a discounted sum of its own centrality ηi and of the
centrality of the other nodes discounted by the weight of
the paths connecting to i through the constant β. Notice
that the constant p1´ βq appears just to normalize pi to a
probability vector.
In our setting, we start with the set of nodes V “ t1, . . . , nu
and we suppose that each node i is a player that assigns
m directed edges from i to m other distinct elements in V.
This construction results in a graph G and the Bonacich
1 A probability vector is a nonnegative vector whose entries sum up
to 1.
centrality of node i in G represents its utility. This can be
thought as a classical game where
‚ V is the set of players;
‚ given i P V, the corresponding set of actions Ai is the
family of all subsets of Vztiu of cardinality m;
‚ given a strategy profile (or configuration) x P A “ś
iAi, we define the graph Gpxq “ pV, Epxqq where
Epxq “ tpi, jq | i P V, j P xiu.
We denote by Rpxq the normalized weight matrix of
Gpxq 2 . Given β P p0, 1q and η P Rn a probability
vector such that ηi ą 0 for all i, we define the utility
vector upxq as
upxq “ p1´ βqpI ´ βRpxq1q´1η.
The game we have introduced is denoted ΓpV, β, η,mq to
recall all the parameters entering in the construction.
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the structure
of Nash equilibria for the game ΓpV, β, η,mq and to in-
vestigate the asymptotic behavior of its best response
dynamics. To this aim, it is convenient to recall some
fundamental definitions.
Given x P A and i P V, we use the usual convention
in game theory to indicate with x´i P A´i “ śk‰iAk
the vector x restricted to the components in Vztiu and to
use the notation x “ pxi, x´iq. The best response actions
Bipx´iq of player i, given the strategy x´i P A´i played
by the other players, is the set of actions xi that maximize
the utility ui, namely
Bipx´iq “ argmaxxiPAiuipxi, x´iq.
A strategy profile x P A is a Nash equilibrium if xi P
Bipx´iq for all i, while x P A is a strict Nash equilibrium
if txiu “ Bipx´iq for all i (i.e. when each player is playing
his best response action and such action is unique). We
denote by N and N st the set of, respectively, the Nash
equilibria and the strict Nash equilibria. Existence of
Nash equilibria is always guaranteed for these games as
they are ordinal potential, that is they admit a function
Ψ : A Ñ R such that uipxi, x´iq ă uipx1i, x´iq if and only
if Ψpxi, x´iq ă Ψpx1i, x´iq; this was proven in Cominetti
et al. (2019). The maxima of the ordinal potential Ψ are
always Nash equilibria (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
The (asynchronous) best response dynamics is the discrete
time Markov chain Xt on the state space A where, at
each time t, exactly one player updates his action by
choosing it among his best response set. More in detail,
the best response dynamics is formally defined as follows:
at every time t P N, a player i is chosen uniformly at
random and he revises his action by picking an element y
in Bi
`pXtq´i˘ uniformly at random. For ordinal potential
games, a classical result of Monderer and Shapley (1996)
assures that the best response dynamics converges in finite
time with probability one to the set N of Nash equilibria,
independently on the initial condition. In general, we can
be more precise regarding this limit set N ˚ Ď N , which is
typically a proper subset. Notice that strict Nash equilibria
are absorbing points of the best response dynamics and
thus N st Ď N ˚; however, in general they are not equal. If
we consider the transition graph on the configuration set
A with edges among configurations corresponding to the
2 That is, Rijpxq “ m´1 if pi, jq P Epxq, Rijpxq “ 0 otherwise.
Fig. 1. An example of a directed graph of type C3,62 .
non zero probability jumps of the best response dynamics
chain,N ˚ can be characterized as the smallest trapping set
of A (no edge leading out of N ˚) that is globally reachable
(from every configuration in A there is a path leading
inside N ˚). Nash equilibria in N ˚ play a crucial role in
the games as they are those the best response dynamics
will eventually converge to, while Nash equilibria in N zN ˚
will only show up in the transient behavior.
Our aim is to investigate the structure of these three sets
N st Ď N ˚ Ď N for the game ΓpV, β, η,mq we have
introduced. The ordinal potential function described in
Cominetti et al. (2019) is unfortunately very complicated
and of little utility in this sense.
3. MAIN RESULTS
In this paper we focus on the case when m “ 1 and
m “ 2, namely when nodes are allowed to set, respectively,
one or two out-links towards other nodes. Through a
detailed description of the best response set Bipx´iq for
every configuration x´i and by exhibiting a much simpler
alternative ordinal potential for the case m “ 1, we are
capable of giving a full description of the three sets N st,
N ˚ and N of Nash equilibria for both cases m “ 1 and
m “ 2. This last case presents a much more complex
behavior and, for certain aspects, as complex as the case
of general m.
3.1 The case of out-degree m “ 1
In order to describe our results, it is convenient to intro-
duce a particular family of graphs.
Definition 1. We call a 2-clique the complete directed
graph (without self-loops) with two nodes and we indicate
it by C2. Given l, r P N, we define Cl,r2 as the directed
graph obtained by taking the disjoint union of l copies of
C2 plus r extra nodes, each of them having exactly one
out-link towards one node in any of the 2-cliques.
Notice that Cl,r2 has exactly n “ 2l`r nodes and all nodes
have out-degree equal to one. Figure 1 is an example of
graph of type Cl,r2 for l “ 3 and r “ 6. The following
theorem is our first main result for the case m “ 1.
Theorem 2. For every choice of β and η, the game
ΓpV, β, η, 1q has the following properties:
(1) ΓpV, β, η, 1q is an ordinal potential w.r.t. the function
Ψ : A Ñ N where Ψpxq is the number of 2-cliques in
Gpxq;
(2) the set of Nash equilibria N coincides with all the
configurations x P A for which Gpxq is of type Cl,r2
with 2l ` r “ n;
(3) the set of strict Nash equilibria N st is empty when
n is odd and it coincides with all the configurations
x P A for which Gpxq is of type Cn{2,02 when n is even.
(a) j j j j
j j j j
(b) i i k
i i j i
Fig. 2. (a) A directed graph of type C
n{2,0
2 with n “ 8;
(b) A directed graph of type C
pn´1q{2,1
2 with n “ 7.
Figure 2 (a) represents a strict Nash equilibrium for the
game ΓpV, β, η, 1q when n “ 8, while Fig. 2(b) shows
a nonstrict Nash equilibrium for n “ 7. The following
corollary completely captures the asymptotic behavior of
the best response dynamics of ΓpV, β, η, 1q; in particular
it shows that the Nash equilibrium of Fig. 2(b) belongs to
N ˚.
Corollary 3. Consider the best response dynamics for the
game ΓpV, β, η, 1q. Then:
‚ if n is even, the limit set N ˚ coincides with N st,
namely it consists of those x P A for which Gpxq is of
type C
n{2,0
2 ;‚ if n is odd, the limit setN ˚ coincides with those x P A
for which Gpxq is of type Cpn´1q{2,12 .
We notice that when n “ 2k, the best response dynam-
ics will eventually be absorbed in any of the |N ˚| “
n!2´kpk!q´1 strict Nash equilibria with probability one.
On the other hand, when n “ 2k ` 1 the best response
dynamics will eventually reach the (unique) trapping set
consisting of |N ˚| “ pn ´ 1qn!2´kpk!q´1 configurations of
type C
pn´1q{2,1
2 . In this case, it can be shown that the best
response dynamics will keep fluctuating ergodically in the
set N ˚ with uniform equilibrium probability.
3.2 The case of out-degree m “ 2
We call ring graph an undirected graph whose vertices
are arranged in a ring so that each vertex has exactly two
neighbors (see for example Fig. 3(a), where each connected
component is a ring graph). The length of a ring graph is
the number of its vertices. From now on we say that an
edge pi, jq in G is undirected if also pj, iq is an edge of
G, otherwise we call it directed. We say that a graph is
undirected if all its edges are undirected. In figures, we
represent directed edges with arrows and undirected edges
with simple lines.
The first main result of this section is a complete charac-
terization of the set of strict Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4. For any choice of β and η, the set of strict
Nash equilibria N st of the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q consists of
all the configurations x P A for which Gpxq is a (finite)
union of ring graphs.
A consequence of this fact is that for any n ě 3 there
always exists a strict Nash equilibrium, as the ring graph
of length n is always one of these. Figure 3(a) provides an
example of strict Nash equilibrium for ΓpV, β, η, 2q with
n “ 9.
We now investigate the structure of all Nash equilibria.
Given a Nash equilibrium x P A, let tGλpxquλ“1,...,Λ be the
decomposition of Gpxq in terms of its strongly connected
components. The condensation graph of Gpxq is defined as
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) Example of strict Nash equilibrium for the game
ΓpV, β, η, 2q with n “ 9. (b) The Butterfly graph.
White nodes do not have unique best response.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Examples of nonstrict Nash equilibria for
ΓpV, β, η, 2q. White nodes do not have unique best
response.
the graph Hpxq whose nodes are the components tGλpxquλ
and where there is an edge from Gλ1pxq to Gλ2pxq if
there exists an edge in Gpxq from a node in Gλ1pxq to a
node in Gλ2pxq. The condensation graph Hpxq is directed
and acyclic. The following theorem describes the topology
of Hpxq, thus characterizing the structure of the Nash
equilibria of the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q. We remind that a
vertex is called a sink if it has zero out-degree and it is
called a source if it has zero in-degree.
Theorem 5. Let x P A be a Nash equilibrium for the game
ΓpV, β, η, 2q, tGλpxquλ“1,...,Λ be the decomposition of Gpxq
in terms of its strongly connected components and Hpxq be
the condensation graph of Gpxq. Then the following facts
hold:
(1) every component Gλpxq is either a sink or a source in
Hpxq (or both if isolated);
(2) every source component is either a singleton or a 2-
clique;
(3) every sink component is either a ring or the Butterfly
graph in Fig. 3(b).
Notice that the Butterfly graph is a nonstrict Nash equi-
librium as the best response of the node in the center
is not unique. Figure 4 provides other two examples of
nonstrict Nash equilibria for the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q: in both
structures we can identify either a singleton or a 2-clique
linking to rings. The nodes in white are the nodes whose
best response is not unique, i.e. they can change action
without decreasing their utility.
Remark 6. Not all the configurations x P A that satisfy
conditions (1), (2) and (3) of Theorem 5 are Nash equi-
libria. Indeed, by direct computation it is easy to see that
the following examples are not Nash equilibria:
(1) a singleton linking to two adjacent nodes in a ring of
length greater or equal than four (see Fig. 5(a));
(2) a 2-clique linking to a single node in a ring of length
greater or equal than four (see Fig. 5(b)).
21
s
n-2 n-3
. . .
j
(a)
21
s
n-3 n-4
. . .j
k
(b)
Fig. 5. (a) Singleton linking to two adjacent nodes in a
ring. (b) 2-clique linking to a single node in a ring.
Black nodes are not in best response.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Convergence of the best response dynamics starting
from the same initial configuration to (a) a strict Nash
equibrium (b) a nonstrict Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to characterize the limit set N ˚ Ă N
for the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q, i.e. the absorbing points of its
best response dynamics.
Corollary 7. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q with |V| “ n,
and let i P t0, 1, 2u such that n “ i mod 3. Then:
‚ if i “ 0, 1, the limit setN ˚ coincides withN st, namely
it consists of those x P A for which Gpxq is a finite
union of ring graphs;
‚ if i “ 2, the limit set N ˚ coincides with N st Y G3b ,
where G3b is the set of all graphs that are finite unions
of rings of length three and a Butterfly graph or finite
unions of rings of length three and a 2-clique linking
to any pair of nodes in the rings (see for example Fig.
5(a) and Fig. 13(b) and (c)).
Figure 6 shows the convergence of the best response
dynamics starting from the same initial configuration to
two different equilibria, namely a strict Nash equilibrium
(union of rings) and a nonstrict Nash equilibrium in G3b
(union of rings of length three and a Butterfly graph).
The simulations have been done by using suitable Matlab
routines.
4. PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
The proofs of our results are based on a probabilistic
interpretation of the game in terms of Markov chains.
This section is structured as follows: we first recall some
preliminary notions and then we apply some classical
results on Markov chains to our game. Finally, in Sections
4.1 and 4.2 we prove the results presented in the previous
section respectively for the case m “ 1 and m “ 2.
A (discrete-time) Markov chain Xt on a finite state space
V “ t1, . . . , nu and with transition matrix P P Rnˆn, P
stochastic, is a sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . .
with values in V s.t. PpXt`1 “ i|X1 “ j1, . . . , Xt “
jtq “ PpXt`1 “ i|Xt “ jtq “ Pijt . Given s P V, we
define Ts :“ inftt ě 0 : Xt “ su the hitting time on
s and Ts` :“ inftt ě 1 : Xt “ su the return time to
s. Given i, s P V, we define τsi :“ EirTss the expected
hitting time on s of the Markov chain Xt with initial
state i. It is known that if P is an irreducible matrix, then
the Markov chain admits a unique invariant distribution,
that is a probability vector pi s.t. pi “ P 1pi. The invariant
distribution pi can be written in terms of hitting times:
Proposition 8. Let Xt be a Markov chain with finite state
space V and irreducible transition matrix P , and let pi be
its (unique) invariant distribution. Then it holds that
pis “
˜
1`
ÿ
iPV
Psiτ
s
i
¸´1
, (4)
where the expected hitting times τsi , i P V, are the only
family of values satisfying the following system:$&%τ
s
i “ 0 if i “ s,
τsi “ 1`
ÿ
jPV
Pijτ
s
j if i ‰ s. (5)
Proof. Equation (4) comes from the fact that pis “
pEsrTs` sq´1 and EsrTs` s “ 1`
ř
iPV Psiτsi , which are both
standard results on Markov chains, as well as (5). See for
example Norris (1997). l
Manipulating (2) and using the fact that 11pi “ 1 with 1
the all-ones vector, we can see that the Bonacich centrality
pi satisfies the relation
pi “ pβR1 ` p1´ βqη11qpi.
Since P “ βR ` p1 ´ βq1η1 is an irreducible stochastic
matrix, this means that pi is the (unique) invariant distri-
bution of the Markov chain having P as transition matrix.
We now use this characterization in the context of our
game. Given a configuration x P A, we write
P pxq “ βRpxq ` p1´ βq1η1 (6)
and we denote by τsi pxq the hitting times on s of the
Markov chain having P pxq as transition matrix and start-
ing from i. When the configuration x is clear from the
context, sometimes we write τsi instead of τ
s
i pxq to ease
the notation. The utility vector upxq can be written in
terms of the formula (4) as:
uspxs, x´sq “
˜
1`
ÿ
iPV
Psipxqτsi pxq
¸´1
. (7)
Notice that the terms Psipxq only depend on xs (the out-
links from s), while the hitting times τsi pxq depend only
on x´s. With slight abuse of notation, we then rewrite the
utility function as
uspxs, x´sq “
˜
1`
ÿ
iPV
Psipxsqτsi px´sq
¸´1
. (8)
A consequence of (8) is an explicit formula describing the
best response actions, as shown by the following corollary.
Corollary 9. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η,mq, a node s P V
and x´s P A´s. Then the set Bspx´sq of the best response
actions of player s when all the other players are playing
the actions x´s can be written as:
Bspx´sq “ argmin
xsPAs
ÿ
iPV
Rsipxsqτsi px´sq. (9)
Proof. It follows from (8) and the definition (6) of P , in
consideration of the fact that the term p1´βq1η1 does not
depend on the configuration x. l
In the following, given x P A we denote by Ns´ pxq the
in-neighborhood of the vertex s in the graph Gpxq, that is
i P Ns´ pxq if and only if s P xi (or equivalently, if and only
if Rispxq ą 0). Notice that Ns´ pxq depends just on x´s so
with a slight abuse of notation we can write Ns´ px´sq.
4.1 The case of out-degree m “ 1
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need to better char-
acterize the best response actions of a player. The first
important observation is the following:
Remark 10. If m “ 1, then for any s P V and xs P As it
holds that Rsxspxsq “ 1 and Rsipxsq “ 0 for all i ‰ xs.
Therefore (9) takes the form:
Bspx´sq “ argminiPVztsuτsi px´sq.
The following proposition shows that the best response
action of a player in the game ΓpV, β, η, 1q takes always
place in his in-neighborhood, as long as it is nonempty.
Proposition 11. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 1q and let
s P V and x´s P A´s. It holds that:
(1) If Ns´ px´sq ‰ H, then Bspx´sq “ Ns´ px´sq;
(2) If Ns´ px´sq “ H, then Bspx´sq “ Vztsu.
Furthermore, it holds that
uspxs, x´sqăuspx1s, x´sq ô xs RNs´ px´sq ^ x1s PNs´ px´sq.
(10)
Proof. p1q Suppose that Ns´ px´sq ‰ H and let i, j, k ‰ s
s.t. i, j P Ns´ px´sq and k R Ns´ px´sq. We show that
τsi “ τsj and τsi ă τsk ; by Remark 10, this implies that
Bspx´sq “ Ns´ px´sq. By Proposition 8, it holds that
τsi “ 1` p1´ βq
ÿ
vPV
ηvτ
s
v , τ
s
j “ 1` p1´ βq
ÿ
vPV
ηvτ
s
v ,
τsk “ 1` p1´ βq
ÿ
vPV
ηvτ
s
v ` βτsxk .
Since τsxk ą 0, it follows that τsi “ τsj and τsi ă τsk .p2q Suppose that Ns´ px´sq “ H and let j ‰ s. This implies
that at every discrete time t, the probability to arrive at
node s from j is equal to p1´ ηsqt´1 ηs. Therefore it holds
that
τsj “ ηs
8ÿ
t“1
t p1´ ηsqt´1 , (11)
which does not depend on j. We have just proven that
τsj “ τsi for every i, j ‰ s, so we conclude by Remark 10.
Finally, by (7) and Remark 10, uspxs, x´sq ă uspx1s, x´sq
if and only if τsxspx´sq ą τsx1spx´sq, which in turn happens
if and only if xs RNs´ px´sq ^ x1s PNs´ px´sq by what just
shown above when proving items p1q and p2q. l
Figure 7 graphically synthesizes Proposition 11. We are
now ready to prove Theorem 2.
(a)
s
Bspx´sq
(b)
s
Bspx´sq
Fig. 7. The best response set Bspx´sq of s in the game
ΓpV, β, η, 1q when its in-neighborhood is (a) not
empty (b) empty.
(a)
s
x1s
xs
Gpxs, x´sq
(b)
s
x1s
xs
Gpx1s, x´sq
Fig. 8. Example where Ψpxs, x´sq ă Ψpx1s, x´sq.
Proof of Theorem 2. p1q We need to prove that
uspxs, x´sq ă uspx1s, x´sq iff Ψpxs, x´sq ă Ψpx1s, x´sq. The
graphs Gpxs, x´sq and Gpx1s, x´sq differ just on one edge,
namely ps, xsq P Epxs, x´sq while ps, xsq R Epx1s, x´sq,
and ps, x1sq R Epxs, x´sq while ps, x1sq P Epx1s, x´sq; they
share all the other edges (see Fig. 8). By Proposition
11, uspxs, x´sq ă uspx1s, x´sq iff xs R Ns´ px´sq and
x1s P Ns´ px´sq, which happens iff s is not in a 2-clique inGpxs, x´sq while s forms a 2-clique with x1s in Gpx1s, x´sq.
Therefore uspxs, x´sq ă uspx1s, x´sq iff Ψpxs, x´sq ă
Ψpx1s, x´sq.p2q A configuration x P A is a Nash equilibrium iff for all
s P V, it holds that xs P Bspx´sq. By Proposition 11, this
happens iff for all s P V s.t. Ns´ px´sq ‰ H, we have that
xs P Ns´ px´sq, thus forming the 2-clique ts, xsu in Gpxq.
Therefore x P A is a Nash equilibrium iff Gpxq is of type
Cl,r2 where r is the number of vertices s P V such that
Ns´ px´sq “ H.p3q A configuration x P A is a strict Nash equilibrium iff
for all s P V, it holds that txsu “ Bspx´sq; by Proposition
11 this in turn holds iff for all s P V, Ns´ px´sq “ txsu.
Therefore for all s P V, ts, xsu must be a 2-clique in Gpxq,
and this is possible iff n is even and Gpxq is of type Cn{2,02 .
l
Corollary 3 easily follows from the theorem we have just
proved and Proposition 11.
Proof of Corollary 3. Consider the graph X on vertex
set A and an edge between pxs, x´sq and px1s, x´sq if
Ψpxs, x´sq ď Ψpx1s, x´sq, where Ψ is the ordinal potential
function defined in Theorem 2. The best response dynam-
ics is a Markov chain Xt on the graph X where each edge
has a nonzero probability. It then sufficies to prove that for
any Nash equilibrium x, there is a path in X from x to a
configuration x1 such that Gpx1q has the maximal number
of 2-cliques. By Theorem 2, Gpxq is of type Cl,r2 ; suppose
l ă pn´ 1q{2. Then by Proposition 11, there are i ‰ j P V
such that they both have zero in-degree in Gpxq. By setting
x1i “ j, x1 “ px1i, x´iq and x2j “ i, x2 “ px2j , x1´ jq, we have
that Ψpxq “ Ψpx1q ă Ψpx2q. In other words, Gpx2q is of
type Cl`1,r´22 and there is a path from x to x2 in X . By
iterating this argument, we conclude. l
4.2 The case of out-degree m “ 2
As in the case of m “ 1, we want to better characterize
the best response actions of a player. The following two
lemmas will be useful for proving the subsequent Proposi-
tion 14, in which we show that the best response actions
of a node s are always towards nodes that are at most at
distance two from it.
Lemma 12. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q, and let x P A
and s P V. It holds that:
(1) for every i ‰ s, τsi pxq ď η´1s p1´ βq´1;
(2) if there exists i ‰ s such that τsi pxq “ η´1s p1´ βq´1,
then Ns´ pxq “ H.
Proof. p1q Let A be a matrix such that for all i P V,
Aii “ β`p1´βqηi and for all j ‰ i, Aij “ p1´βqηj . If we
denote by τˆsi the expected hitting time of the Markov chain
Xˆt with transition matrix A and initial state s, by solving
the system (5) it is easy to see that for all i, k ‰ s it holds
that τˆsi “ τˆsk . This in turn implies that for every i ‰ s,
τˆsi “ η´1s p1 ´ βq´1. In Xˆt the probability to jump from
any node i to s is always equal to p1 ´ βqηs, while in the
Markov chain Xt associated to our game (with transition
matrix as in (6)) the probability to jump from any node i
to s is always greater or equal than p1 ´ βqηs. It follows
that τsi ď τˆsi , so we conclude.p2q Let i ‰ s such that τsi “ η´1s p1 ´ βq´1. We first
show that for every j ‰ s, τsj “ η´1s p1 ´ βq´1. Indeed,
suppose by contrary that there exists j ‰ s such that
τsj ă η´1s p1 ´ βq´1. If a, b P V are the vertices such that
xi “ ta, bu, then by system (5) it holds that
τsi “ 1` p1´ βq
ÿ
vPV
ηvτ
s
v ` β2 pτ
s
a ` τsb q.
In view of item p1q, this implies that τsi ă η´1s p1 ´ βq´1,
which is a contradiction; therefore τsj “ η´1s p1 ´ βq´1.
Suppose now by contradiction that Ns´ pxq ‰ H and let
k P Ns´ pxq and a ‰ s such that a P xk. By system (5) it
holds that
τsk “ 1` p1´ βq
ÿ
vPV
ηvτ
s
v ` β2 τ
s
a . (12)
As τsv “ η´1s p1´βq´1 for every v ‰ s and τss “ 0, equation
(12) implies that β “ 0; this is a contradiction and so we
conclude. l
The next lemma provides a different upper bound on the
return times τsi pxq when |Ns´ pxq| ě 1. We denote by
N´2s pxq the set Ns´ pxq Y tNt´ pxq : t P Ns´ pxqu, that is
the in-neighborhood of s in Gpxq at distance at most two.
Notice that also N´2s pxq depends just on x´s so we can
write as well N´2s px´sq.
Lemma 13. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q and let x P A
and s P V such that |Ns´ pxq| ě 1. Consider a node
k P Ns´ pxq and let T1 “ p1 ´ β2 qp1 ´ βq´1pηs ` β2 ηkq´1
and T2 “ p1´ βq´1pηs ` β2 ηkq´1. Then it holds that:
(1) τskpxq ď T1 and for all i ‰ k, τsi pxq ď T2;
(2) if τskpxq “ T1 and for all i ‰ k, s it holds that
τsi pxq “ T2, then |N´2s pxq| “ 1.
Proof. p1q Let τsmax “ maxjPV τsj . By system (5) it holds
that τsmax ď 1`p1´βqηkτsk`p1´βqp1´ηs´ηkqτsmax`βτsmax,
which implies that
τsmax ď p1´ βq´1pηk ` ηsq´1 ` ηkpηk ` ηsq´1τsk . (13)
At the same time, by system (5) it holds that τsk ď 1 `p1´ βqp1´ ηs´ ηkqτsmax` p1´ βqηkτsk ` pβ{2qτsmax, which
implies that
τsk ď
1`
”
p1´ βqp1´ ηk ´ ηsq ` β2
ı
τsmax
1´ p1´ βqηk . (14)
By substituting inequality (13) in (14), the following upper
bound is obtained:
τsk ď T1 “
ˆ
1´ β
2
˙
p1´ βq´1
ˆ
ηs ` β
2
ηk
˙´1
,
while by substituting inequality (14) in (13) we obtain:
τsmax ď T2 “ p1´ βq´1
ˆ
ηs ` β
2
ηk
˙´1
.
(2) It sufficies to prove that assuming that there exists
a node j P Ns´ pxq Y N´k pxq with j ‰ k leads to a
contradiction. Let j P Ns´ pxq Y N´k pxq with j ‰ k and
let b P V such that xj “ tk, bu. By system (5), τsj satisfies:
τsj ď 1` p1´ βq
ÿ
iPV
ηiτ
s
i ` β2 pτ
s
k ` τsb q . (15)
By substituting the values of the τsi ’s in the hypothesis
and by observing that T1 ă T2, equation (15) leads to:
T2 ď 1` p1´ βq pT2 ` ηkT1 ´ pηk ` ηsqT2q ` β
2
pT1 ` T2q
ă 1` p1´ βq pT2 ` ηkT2 ´ pηk ` ηsqT2q ` β
2
p2T2q
ă
„
p1´ βqβ
2
ηk ` 1

p1´ βq´1
ˆ
ηs ` β
2
ηk
˙´1
ă T2,
which is a contradiction. This means that the set Ns´ pxqY
N´k pxq has to be equal to tku and so |N´2s pxq| “ 1. l
The following proposition characterizes the set of the best
response actions of a player in the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q and
it will play a key role in both the proofs of Theorem 4 and
Theorem 5. From now on, fixed s P V and x P A, we label
the elements of V in such a way that V “ ts, v1, . . . , vn´1u
and
0 “ τss pxq ă τsv1pxq ď τsv2pxq ď ¨ ¨ ¨ ď τsvn´1pxq. (16)
Proposition 14. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q, and let
x P A and s P V. It holds that:
(1) if N´2s pxq “ H, then Bspx´sq “
 tv, wu : v, w P
Vztsu, v ‰ w(;
(2) if |N´2s pxq| “ 1, then Bspx´sq “
 tr, vu : v P
Vzts, ru(, where tru “ N´2s pxq “ Ns´ pxq;
(3) if |N´2s pxq| ě 2, then Bspx´sq Ď
 tv, wu : v, w P
Ns´ pxq, v ‰ w
( Y  tv, wu : v P Ns´ pxq and w P
Nv´ pxq
(
.
Proof. p1q If N´2s pxq “ H, then τsj can still be expressed
as in (11), so we conclude.
p2q We remind that we label the elements of V in such a
way that (16) holds. We first show that v1 P Ns´ pxq. By
contradiction, suppose that v1 R Ns´ pxq; then xv1 “ ta, bu
for some a, b ‰ s. It holds that
τsv1 “ 1`p1´βq
ÿ
vPV
ηvτ
s
v`β2 pτ
s
a`τsb q ě 1`τsv1´ηsp1´βqτsv1 ,
which implies that τsv1 ě η´1s p1 ´ βq´1. By Lemma 12, it
follows that τsv1 “ η´1s p1´βq´1 and Ns´ pxq “ H, which is
a contradiction. Therefore, if N´2s pxq “ Ns´ pxq “ tru, it
holds that r “ v1 and so r P xs for any xs P Bspx´sq. We
now show that τsj “ τsk for every j, k ‰ r, s, which implies
that Bspx´sq “
 tr, vu : v P Vzts, ru(. By hypothesis, for
every j ‰ s, r, the probability to jump from j to s is equal
to p1 ´ βqηs and the probability to jump from j to r is
equal to p1´βqηr. Therefore the probability to jump from
j to k ‰ r, s is equal to 1 ´ p1 ´ βqpηs ` ηrq. It follows
that the probability to arrive in s from j in exactly t steps
without passing through r is equal to p1 ´ βqηsp1 ´ p1 ´
βqpηs ` ηrqqt´1 and the probability to arrive in r from j
in exactly t steps without passing through s is equal to
p1´ βqηrp1´ p1´ βqpηs ` ηrqqt´1. Consequently,
τsj “
8ÿ
t“1
p1´ βqptηs ` ηrpt` τsr qq
`
1´ p1´ βqpηs ` ηrq
˘t´1
,
which does not depend on j.
p3q Suppose that |N´2s pxq| ě 2. We already proved that
v1 P Ns´ pxq; we need to prove that either v2 P Ns´ pxq or
v2 P Nv´1pxq. Suppose by contradiction that this is not the
case and let a, b ‰ s, v1 such that xv2 “ ta, bu. By applying
system (5) to express τsv2 and by using the fact that for all
j ě 2, τsvj ě τsv2 , it holds that:
τsv2 ě
1
p1´ βqpηv1 ` ηsq `
ηv1
ηv1 ` ηs τ
s
v1 . (17)
Moreover, by applying system (5) to express τsv1 and by
using again the fact that for all j ě 2, τsvj ě τsv2 , it holds
that:
τsv1 ě
1`
”
p1´ βqp1´ ηv1 ´ ηsq ` β2
ı
τsv2
1´ p1´ βqηv1 . (18)
By substituting inequality (17) in (18) and inequality (18)
in (17) we obtain respectively:
τsv1 ě T1 and τsv2 ě T2,
where T1 and T2 are defined in Lemma 13. Therefore, by
(16) and item (1) of Lemma 13, it holds that τsv1 “ T1, and
for all j ě 2, τsvj “ T2. By applying item (2) of the same
lemma it follows that |N´2s pxq| “ 1, which contradicts the
hypothesis. l
Figure 9 graphically synthesizes Proposition 14. Notice
that in view of Proposition 14, the best response of a node
s can be unique only in the case |N´2s pxq| ě 2.
Proof of Theorem 4. We first prove that a ring graph
on n vertices is a strict Nash equilibrium for ΓpV, β, η, 2q.
If n “ 3 the proof is trivial. Suppose then that n ą 3 and
consider the ring graph as in Fig. 10(a); we want to show
that the node s is in its (unique) best response, that is we
want to show that τs1 , τ
s
n´1 ă τsv for all v ‰ 1, n´1. By the
sBspx´sq
(a)
s
r
Bspx´sq
(b)
s
Bspx´sq Ď
(c)
Fig. 9. The best response set Bspx´sq of s in the game
ΓpV, β, η, 2q when Ns´ pxq is (a) empty (b) of cardinal-
ity one (c) of cardinality greater than one.
(a)
21
s
n-1 n-2
. . .
(b)
sj
i
Fig. 10. (a) A ring graph on n nodes. (b) The directed
graph Tpj,sq,i.
symmetry of the graph, τs1 “ τsn´1 and τs2 “ τsn´2. In view
of Proposition 14, it then suffices to show that τs1 ă τs2 . By
system (5), we have that τs2´τs1 “ pβ{2qpτs1´τs2 q`pβ{2qτs3 ,
which implies that τs2 ą τs1 since τs3 ą 0.
We now show that if x˚ is a strict Nash equilibrium for
ΓpV, β, η, 2q, then Gpx˚q is undirected, which implies that
Gpx˚q is the union of ring graphs since by construction
each vertex of Gpx˚q has out-degree equal to 2. Assume by
contradiction that there exists a strict Nash equilibrium
x and two nodes s, j P V such that ps, jq P Epxq but
pj, sq R Epxq. Since x is a strict Nash equilibrium, all the
nodes are in their best response and |Bvpxq| “ 1 for all
v P V. By Proposition 14 we know that s P N´2j pxq: since
pj, sq R Epxq, it means that there exists i ‰ j, s such that
ps, iq, pi, jq, pj, iq P Epxq (see Fig. 11(a) ). Proposition 14
also implies that i P N´2s pxq. If i P Ns´ pxq, by system (5)
it holds that τsi ´ τsj “ pβ{2qpτsj ´ τsi q and so τsi “ τsj .
Therefore we have that either ps, jq P Epxq or |Bspxq| ą 1,
both cases leading to a contradiction. We now examine the
case i P N´2s pxqzNs´ pxq: by Proposition 14 there exists
k ‰ i, s such that pi, kq, pk, sq, ps, kq P Epxq (see Fig.
11(b) ). Proposition 14 also implies that k P N´2i pxq. If
k P N´i pxq, we are in the situation represented in Fig.
11(c); by using system (5), it is easy to see that τsj “ τsk .
This implies that either k “ j (in which case ps, jq P Epxq)
or |Bspxq| ą 1, so we always arrive to a contradiction.
Finally, we need to consider the case k P N´2i pxqzN´i pxq:
since the actions of i are determined as in Fig. 11(b), it
must hold that pk, jq P Epxq, as represented in Fig. 11(d).
By using again system (5) to express τsi and τ
s
j , we get
that p1 ` β{2qpτsi ´ τsj q “ pβ{2qτsk ą 0 and so τsi ą τsj .
This implies that either s is not in its best response or
its best response is not unique, both cases leading to a
contradiction. l
(a)
i
j s
(b)
i
j s
k
(c)
i
j s
k
(d)
i
j s
k
Fig. 11. Explanatory directed graphs used in the proof of
Theorem 4 and Lemma 16.
Before proving Theorem 5, we first need the following
definition and Lemma 16.
Definition 15. We denote by Tpj,sq,i the directed graph on
the vertices ti, j, su having one directed edge pj, sq and all
the other edges undirected (see Fig. 10(b)).
In the following we will sometimes refer to a graph of type
Tpj,sq,i as a triangle.
Lemma 16. Let x P A be a Nash equilibrium for the game
ΓpV, β, η, 2q, Hpxq be the condensation graph of Gpxq and
let Gλpxq “ pVλ, Eλq be a sink in Hpxq. If there exists
pj, sq P Eλ that is directed, then Gλpxq contains a structure
of type Tpj,sq,i.
Proof. Notice that since the out-degree of each node in
Gλpxq is equal to two, this graph must contain at least
three nodes and |N´2j pxq| ě 2. By Proposition 14, it
follows that s P N´2j pxq and there exists i P Vλ such
that ps, iq, pi, jq, pj, iq P Eλ (see Fig. 11(a) ). We are left
to prove that pi, sq P Eλ. If this was not the case, then
by Proposition 14 there would exist k P Vλ such that
pi, kq, pk, sq, ps, kq P Eλ, i.e. the graph in Fig. 11(b) would
be a subgraph of Gλpxq. In this configuration, the only way
i could be at equilibrium is that pk, iq P Eλ, as otherwise
tj, su would give it a strictly better utility than tj, ku. We
would then be in the configuration of Fig. 11(c); but in
this case s is not at equilibrium, as tj, ku gives it a strictly
better utility than ti, ku. This completes the proof. l
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider any component Gλpxq “
pVλ, Eλq that is not a sink in Hpxq. Necessarily, there
must exist i P Vλ such that Nipxq Ę Vλ. In particular,
this implies that |N´2i pxq| ď 1 by Proposition 14. If
|N´2i pxq| “ 0, it means that Vλ “ tiu is a singleton.
If |N´2i pxq| “ 1, then necessarily Vλ “ ti, ju for some
j ‰ i and so Gλpxq is the 2-clique on ti, ju. Notice that in
both cases, there cannot be any other component Gλ1pxq
linking to Gλpxq in the condensation graph, as otherwise
the condition |N´2i pxq| ď 1 would be violated. This proves
items p1q and p2q.
We now study the structure of the sink components.
Suppose that the component Gλpxq “ pVλ, Eλq is not a
ring graph and thus not undirected; then there must exist
at least two directed edges in Eλ. Let pj, sq be one of these
directed edges and let Tpj,sq,i be the corresponding triangle
(see Definition 15 and Lemma 16). We now discuss how
ji
s k
r
t
Fig. 12. Explanatory graph for the proof of Theorem 5.
any other triangle Tpr,kq,t in Gλpxq can possibly intersect
with Tpj,sq,i. Notice that, since the out-degree of all nodes
in Gλpxq is 2, the two triangles cannot intersect in the
nodes of out-degree equal to two in the corresponding
triangles, namely ti, juXtr, k, tu “ H and tr, tuXti, j, su “
H. Therefore the only possibility is that they have just
one node in common, namely s “ k; this corresponds to
the Butterfly graph (see Fig. 3(b)). Since in the Butterfly
graph every node has out-degree equal to 2, it necessarily
coincides with the connected component Gλpxq. If instead
Tpj,sq,i does not intersect any other triangle, there must
exist a sequence of distinct nodes s1 “ s, s2, . . . , sl “ r,
with l ě 2, such that tsa, sa`1u are 2-cliques in Gλpxq
for a “ 1, . . . , l ´ 1 and such that there exists a triangle
Tpr,kq,t in Gλpxq for some k, t. Since there cannot be any
incoming directed edge in r by hypothesis, we deduce that
N´2r pxq “ tsl´1, sl´2u if l ě 3 and N´2r pxq “ ti, j, su if
l “ 2. This last case is impossible since it would result
that k P ti, j, su, contrarily to what we had assumed. In
the case when l ě 3, we obtain that k “ sl´2 that leads to
the graph depicted in Fig. 12. A direct computation shows
that nodes s and k are however not at equilibrium in this
configuration. This completes the proof. l
Finally, we provide the proofs of Remark 6 and Corollary
7.
Proof of Remark 6. (1) Consider Fig. 5(a); we show that
node s is not playing an action in its best response set.
Indeed by system (5), it holds that τsj ´ τs1 “ β2 pτs1 ´ τs2 q.
In the proof of Theorem 4 we showed that if the ring
has length greater or equal than four, then τs1 ă τs2 and
therefore τsj ă τs1 . It follows that node s is not playing
a best response action and so such configuration is not a
Nash equilibrium.
(2) Consider Fig. 5(b); we show that node s is not playing
an action in its best response set. Let S “ řvPV ηvτsv .
By symmetry, τsj “ τsk and so by system (5), it holds that
τsj “ 1`p1´βqS`pβ{2qτsj . Let τsmin “ minvPV τsv ; it is easy
to see that τsmin ě 1` p1´ βqS ` pβ{2qτsmin and therefore
τsj “ τsmin. It now sufficies to show that τs1 ă τsj . By system
(5), τs1 ´τsj “ pβ{2qpτs2 ´τsj q; in the proof of Theorem 4 we
showed that τs2 ą τs1 , and therefore τs2 ą τsmin “ τsj , which
in turn implies that τs1 ă τsj . It follows that node s is not
playing a best response action and so such configuration
is not a Nash equilibrium. l
In the following, with a slight abuse of notation we call
singleton a node with zero in-degree and two out-links
(see node j in Fig. 5(a)) and 2-clique a set of two vertices
linking to each other and having another out-link each (see
nodes j and k in Fig. 5(b)).
Proof of Corollary 7. By definition of the limit set, we
know that N st Ď N ˚. Let x P N ˚zN st and let Gpxq be
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 13. Transitions of the Butterfly graph.
its associated graph; Gpxq must have a directed link. The
first key observation is that the transition states of the
Butterfly graph are the ones shown in Fig. 13, which are all
Nash equilibria. Hence, every time the graph Gpxq contains
a Butterfly graph, there is a nonzero probability that in
the best response dynamics the nodes in the Butterfly
will assume the configurations (b) or (c) in Fig. 13, i.e.
a configuration with a 2-clique linking to a ring of length
three. The second key observation is that Gpxq cannot
contain more than one source, i.e. it can have at most one
singleton or one 2-clique. In fact, since by Proposition 14
both singletons and nodes in a 2-clique are always playing
a best response action independently on the node they
are linking to, there is a nonzero probability that they
will direct their links to another singleton or node in a
2-clique, which will not be playing a best response action
anymore. Therefore Gpxq has either a singleton, a 2-clique
or a Butterfly graph, as the Butterfly graph transforms
with nonzero probability into a 2-clique linking to a ring.
We are left with the following cases:
(1) Gpxq is a collection of rings and a singleton. It follows
from Remark 6 that Gpxq cannot have rings with more
than three nodes. If all the rings have length three,
there is a nonzero probability that the singleton j will
link to two adjacent nodes s and i of a ring. In this
case it is easy to verify that τ ij “ τ is, and so there is a
nonzero probability to end up in a configuration like
the one in Fig. 11(c), which has been proved not to
be a Nash equilibrium in the proof of Theorem 4. It
follows that Gpxq cannot contain singletons.
(2) Gpxq is a collection of rings and a 2-clique. By Remark
6, Gpxq cannot have rings with more than three nodes,
so all the rings have length three. It follows that the
2-clique can either form configurations (b) or (c) in
Fig. 13 or configuration (a) in Fig. 4, which are all
Nash equilibria. Hence Gpxq P G3b .
(3) Gpxq is a collection of rings and a Butterfly graph.
In view of the considerations we have made on the
Butterfly graph, there is a nonzero probability to end
up in the case (2), which implies that all the rings
have length three. Consequently, Gpxq P G3b .
We just proved thatN ˚zN st Ď G3b . At the same time, since
configurations (b) and (c) in Fig. 13 and configuration
(a) in Fig. 4 are all Nash equilibria, it holds that G3b ĎN ˚zN st. Hence N ˚ “ N st Y G3b , noticing that G3b is not
empty if and only if n “ 2 mod 3. l
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied a game in which every node
of a network aims at maximizing its Bonacich centrality
by choosing where to direct its out-links, whose number is
fixed to be equal to m. We have completely characterized
the sets N st, N ˚ and N of Nash equilibria in the case
m “ 1 and the sets N st and N ˚ in the case m “ 2. Our
results show that the centrality maximization performed
by each node tends to create disconnected and undirected
networks, partially due to the fact that the best response
of a node is always local. In particular, both for m “ 1 and
m “ 2 all the m-regular undirected netwoks result to be
(strict) Nash equilibria. A natural follow-up of our work
would be the analysis of Nash equilibria of the game for
a general m, possibly different for each node. Preliminary
numerical experiments show that already for m “ 3 the
problem becomes much more complex, as it seems that
the set of Nash equilibria depends also on the parameter
β (which is not the case for m “ 1, 2) and there are
examples of undirected m-regular networks that are not
Nash equilibria.
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